Back to the Future on Presidential Appointments by Light, Paul C.
LIGHT IN PRINTER FINAL (COMPLETED) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2015 1:53 AM 
 
Duke Law Journal 
VOLUME 64 MAY 2015 NUMBER 8 
BACK TO THE FUTURE ON PRESIDENTIAL 
APPOINTMENTS 
Foreword 
PAUL C. LIGHT† 
This issue of the Duke Law Journal takes readers back in time to 
the constitutional origins of today’s sluggish presidential 
appointments process, into the present with sharp analysis of recent 
cases and data on how the process is working, and forward into a 
more hopeful future of potential innovations that might restore some 
balance to what appears to be an entirely dysfunctional appointments 
process. This collection of articles brings fresh insights, data, and even 
a bit of optimism to resolving the tension between the Senate’s 
advice-and-consent power and the President’s obligation to take care 
that the laws are faithfully executed.  
There is little doubt that the presidential appointments process is 
plagued by partisanship and delay. Presidents require more and more 
time to find, recruit, vet, and nominate the senior officers of 
government; nominees require more and more time to answer 
hundreds of often duplicative questions about all aspects of their 
personal lives; and the Senate requires more and more time to 
seemingly do little at all.1 Off-the-record interviews with presidential 
personnel officers and White House staff suggest that Presidents have 
little choice but to pick nominees who have the time and zip codes to 
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 1. See, e.g., PAUL C. LIGHT, A GOVERNMENT ILL EXECUTED: THE DECLINE OF THE 
FEDERAL SERVICE AND HOW TO REVERSE IT 80–101 (2008). 
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outlast the elongated process, meaning that more and more 
appointees come from inside the Washington Beltway.2 
This is not to ignore the recent streamlining that liberated more 
than 150 presidential appointees from the Senate confirmation 
process, and produced long-overdue cuts in the number of national 
security questions, along with slight improvements to the financial 
disclosure process and the downloadable forms required. The reforms 
were no doubt helpful, but shaved only a few days off the delays and 
only a few questions off the forms. And the streamlining completely 
ignored the President’s opaque pre-announcement vetting process, 
which asks nominees to reveal every possible embarrassment that 
might be found in their writings, diaries, and emails, any history of 
gun use, and family conduct, as well as a guess about any individual, 
organization, or news outlet that might criticize their nomination 
either “overtly or covertly, fairly or unfairly.”3 It is little wonder that 
the forms drive many appointees directly to their accountants and tax 
advisers to avoid the kind of false statements that forced Housing and 
Urban Development Secretary Henry Cisneros to resign in 1995. It is 
also no surprise that long-time reformer Colby College Professor G. 
Calvin Mackenzie once described the appointments process as “nasty 
and brutish without being short.”4 
Despite these frustrations, a majority of civic leaders in the 
nation’s top universities, largest corporations and law firms, and 
leading think tanks say that it would be an honor to serve as a 
presidential appointee.5 Unfortunately, they also describe the 
appointments process as unfair, confusing, and embarrassing, and 
believe that a presidential appointment would create considerable 
disruption in their personal lives; they also see Washington, D.C. as a 
difficult place to live. The spirit of service is strong, but the process 
for entry is a mess. Moreover, many presidential appointees worry 
that they will not have a job back home once their service is over.6 
 
 2. See id. at 90–95. 
 3. The Obama administration’s 63-item, single-spaced 2008 transition questionnaire is 
available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/13apply_questionnaire.pdf. 
 4. G. Calvin Mackenzie, Nasty & Brutish Without Being Short: The State of the 
Presidential Appointment Process, 19 BROOKINGS REV. 2, 4 (2001). 
 5. PAUL C. LIGHT & VIRGINIA L. THOMAS, BROOKINGS INST., POSTS OF HONOR: HOW 
AMERICA’S CORPORATE AND CIVIC LEADERS VIEW PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS 9–10 
(2001), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2001/1/
10governance-light/januarysurvey.pdf. 
 6. Id. 
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Most scholars and commentators agree that the barriers to 
appointment have worsened over the decades, which has led to one 
blue-ribbon study group after another, not to mention congressional 
study commissions and the 2012 White House Working Group on 
Streamlining Paperwork for Executive Nominations.7 The Brookings 
Institution even sponsored a task force in 2012 that produced a final 
report entitled “A Half-Empty Government Can’t Govern: Why 
Everyone Wants to Fix the Appointments Process, Why It Never 
Happens, and How We Can Get It Done.”8 
The problem with these failed efforts has not been a lack of 
promising ideas and urgent calls for reform, however. Both have been 
in ample supply over the years, perhaps even to the point where there 
are not too few proposals, but too many. Nor has the problem been a 
lack of occasional congressional action. Congress has passed a half-
dozen reform statutes over the decades: all small-scale, but all 
reforms nonetheless. Congress passed the Presidential Transitions 
Effectiveness Act in 1988,9 amendments to the supposedly action-
forcing Vacancies Act in 1988 and 1998,10 the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act in 2004,11 the Pre-Election Presidential 
Transition Act in 2010,12 and the 2011 Presidential Appointment 
Efficiency and Streamlining Act in 2011,13 all of which are discussed 
 
 7. See WHITE HOUSE WORKING GROUP ON STREAMLINING PAPERWORK FOR 
EXECUTIVE NOMINATIONS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CHAIRS AND RANKING 
MEMBERS OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY & GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS 
AND THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON RULES & ADMINISTRATION (2012), available at 
http://whitehousetransitionproject.org/resources/briefing/appointments/Report%20of%20S679
%20Working%20Group-Final.pdf. 
 8. See generally WILLIAM A. GALSTON & E. J. DIONNE, JR., BROOKINGS INST., A HALF-
EMPTY GOVERNMENT CAN’T GOVERN: WHY EVERYONE WANTS TO FIX THE APPOINTMENTS 
PROCESS, WHY IT NEVER HAPPENS, AND HOW WE CAN GET IT DONE (2010), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/12/14-appointments-galston-
dionne/1214_appointments_galston_dionne. pdf (reporting on the task force). 
 9. Presidential Transitions Effectiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-398, 102 Stat. 985 
(codified at 3 U.S.C. § 102 note). The Vacancies Act amendments were contained in the 
Presidential Transitions Effectiveness Act of 1988. 
 10. Presidential Transitions Effectiveness Act § 7; Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, 
Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345–3349(d)). 
 11. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 
Stat. 3638. 
 12. Pre-Election Presidential Transition Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-283, 124 Stat. 3045 
(codified at 3 U.S.C. § 102 note). 
 13. Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-
166, 126 Stat. 1283 (codified at 3 U.S.C. § 102 note). 
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here and there in this issue. As we shall also see, the Supreme Court 
weighed in occasionally over the years to clarify the recess rules. 
Alas, these statutes and decisions had minimal lasting effects in 
either accelerating the process or reducing its burden. Indeed, the 
streamlining effort may have raised the political returns on delaying 
the confirmation process of the senior officers who were still subject 
to Senate review. Nevertheless, there was at least some momentum 
that could produce comprehensive action. Thus, the 1988 Presidential 
Transitions Effectiveness Act gave the major-party presidential 
candidates incentives and funding to begin their post-election 
planning during the campaign; the amendments to the 1863 Vacancies 
Act established a new clock for filling vacant presidential 
appointments; the Pre-Election Presidential Transition Act provided 
authority for transition planning during the campaign; the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act gave the major-
party nominees authority to submit the names of transition-team 
members for national-security clearance before Election Day; and the 
Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act cut the 
number of Senate-confirmed presidential appointments by 163, even 
as the Senate created a “privileged” review process for 272 
appointments, including some of the 163 that were exempted from 
the traditional confirmation process.14 The Senate added to the 
reforms in 2013 when it adopted the “nuclear option,” which 
effectively ended filibusters on all presidential nominations except for 
those to the Supreme Court. 
It is not yet clear whether these changes have improved the 
presidential appointments process, be it measured by speed, cost, or 
the burden on individual nominees. Indeed, this issue of the Duke 
Law Journal strongly suggests that the process continues to be nasty, 
brutish, and not very short, while Presidents still face significant 
delays in winning Senate confirmation.15 
 
 14. For a summary of the Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act and 
its history, see MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41872, PRESIDENTIAL 
APPOINTMENTS, THE SENATE’S CONFIRMATION PROCESS, AND CHANGES MADE IN THE 112TH 
CONGRESS (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41872.pdf. 
 15. Moreover, I expect that some future scandal will force Congress to reconsider many of 
the exceptions embedded in the Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act, 
especially for assistant secretaries, who have historically exercised significant policymaking 
responsibilities through the management, budget, and legislative-clearance process within their 
departments and agencies.  
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Some blame this sorry state of affairs on vengeful 
Republicans.16 But Democrats have been equally cavalier, if not 
quite so active in delaying appointees. Even Vice President Joe 
Biden exercised the Advice and Consent Clause to delay two George 
W. Bush administration Department of Transportation nominees. 
Even as he extolled each nominee’s qualifications, then-Senator 
Biden (D-Delaware) told his colleagues that his “frustration is 
reaching the boiling point.” Biden was not frustrated with the 
administration, however. He was frustrated with the lack of Senate 
action and angered by the Senate’s opposition to his $1.8 billion 
railroad infrastructure bill.17 
Like a football scrum, it hardly matters which party threw the 
first punch in the pileup. Nor is the first punch particularly relevant in 
an era when both parties have ample incentive to use the 
appointments process to score political points that cannot find a home 
anywhere else in the legislative process. What matters is the impact 
on the faithful execution of the laws. 
More importantly, complaints about the presidential 
appointments process predate the current era of hyper-partisanship. 
Indeed, the first indictment of the contemporary appointments 
process came from the National Academy of Public Administration in 
a 1985 report entitled Leadership in Jeopardy: The Fraying of the 
Presidential Appointments System. Its conclusions could be used 
today: 
  The time is nigh to recognize the importance of the presidential 
appointments system in the operation of government in the United 
States and to face up to the problems that currently beset that 
system. If we do so now, we can revitalize a unique leadership 
selection mechanism that has long been one of the adornments of 
the American experiment in self-government. If we fail, that 
adornment will continue to corrode and the price—to those who run 
the government and to those who are served by it—will be high 
indeed.18 
 
 16. See generally, e.g., NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN & THOMAS E. MANN, IT’S EVEN WORSE 
THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW 
POLITICS OF EXTREMISM (2012).  
 17. Paul C. Light, The Other March Madness, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 11, 2002), 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0411/p09s02-coop.html. 
 18. NAT’L ACADEMY OF PUB. ADMIN., LEADERSHIP IN JEOPARDY: THE FRAYING OF THE 
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS SYSTEM 30 (1985), available at http://www.
politicalappointeeproject.org/sites/default/files/leadershipInJeopardy.pdf. 
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The passage could be cut and pasted into almost any editorial on 
the current process, but is especially apt for this issue of the Duke 
Law Journal. Although there are occasional references to 
partisanship in the following pages, the five authors who have 
contributed to this body of work are ever aware of the constitutional 
history embedded in the current tension. Yet, even as they puzzle 
about the current state of the process, they clearly understand that 
today’s delays and frustration were sown at the Founding. 
University of Louisville Professor Russell L. Weaver explores 
these early decisions through a particularly accessible summary of the 
Founders’ intent in creating what eventually became today’s crushing 
appointments process.19 Leading with a quick introduction about the 
so-called “Borking” of especially visible and controversial Supreme 
Court nominees,20 Weaver rightly acknowledges slight improvements 
in the wake of the many reforms discussed above, but argues that the 
process has become more sluggish and polarized nonetheless.21 So 
noted, he finds the source of the problems in the Framers’ intent. The 
process was designed to be inefficient, or so I interpret his argument, 
and it is clearly fulfilling this promise.22 The appointments power is 
another of those shared powers that may be particularly sensitive to 
partisanship, but it is intentionally structured for conflict nonetheless. 
Weaver’s article makes the point by returning to the Founding 
itself, and its embrace of the principles of the Enlightenment. The 
Founders trusted neither people nor government, and therefore 
created a system that remains highly sensitive to stalemate and 
delay.23 As Weaver argues in drawing upon the Federalist Papers, the 
Constitution’s Appointments Clause is “fully consistent with the 
doctrines of separation of powers and checks and balances.”24 
Although one can easily argue that legislative productivity is a sign of 
the constitutional apocalypse, the Founders might congratulate 
themselves for designing a system that stops so much bad legislation. 
Just imagine what the policy agenda would look like if Congress had 
been highly productive in recent years—the American public might 
 
 19. See generally Russell L. Weaver, “Advice and Consent” in Historical Perspective, 64 
DUKE L.J. 1717 (2015). 
 20. Id. at 1719. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 1752. 
 23. Id. at 1724. 
 24. Id. at 1727. 
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be just as distrustful, but the statutes would be crowded with endless 
contradictions and strikeouts. 
This is not to argue that the Founders were unified about the 
need to “check” and “balance” the appointments power, but their 
worries were mostly unfounded during the first century or so of the 
Republic. Although Weaver uses judicial appointments to illustrate 
his points, his analysis of the contemporary sources of delay is 
relevant to even obscure executive nominations. Once again, 
however, he writes that none of this should surprise us.25 It might 
undermine effective administration, but it is easily explained given 
checks and balances on partisan steroids. 
University of Alabama Professor Ronald J. Krotoszynski brings 
Weaver’s historical analysis into sharp relief26 by examining the 
Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in National Labor Relations Board v. 
Noel Canning.27 As he writes, the decision “confirms that the federal 
appointments process resists any easy or obvious separation-of-
powers analysis.”28 Presidents are free to interpret vague language to 
their comfort, but so are senators and justices. Faced with seemingly 
endless schoolyard brawls over well-qualified nominees, Presidents 
often search for end-arounds and “innovations” that just might break 
the stalemates, end the suffering of long-stalled nominees, and, most 
importantly, secure the faithful execution of the laws. 
Krotoszynski dissects the Noel Canning decision with great skill 
and thoroughness. Framing his analysis as a contest between 
formalism and functionalism, he shows great respect for the deftness 
embedded in Justice Stephen Breyer’s majority opinion, which 
Krotoszynski describes as a novel “third way” of resolving separation-
of-powers questions “when conflicting specific constitutional 
mandates make it impossible to advance one constitutional 
imperative without, at the same time, doing violence to another.”29 
Krotoszynski reminds us that the Framers understood that 
“inaction could lead to gridlock,”30 which might seem like a 
contradiction, but the insight leads him to thoughtful reminders about 
 
 25. Id. at 1721. 
 26. See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transcending Formalism and Functionalism 
in Separation-of-Powers Analysis: Reframing the Appointments Power after Noel Canning, 64 
DUKE L.J. 1513 (2015). 
 27. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). 
 28. Krotoszynski, supra note 26, at 1515. 
 29. Id. at 1515–16. 
 30. Id. at 1523. 
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defaults, workarounds, and other “innovations,” as other authors in 
this issue call them, that might convert inaction into progress. Some 
innovations reflect the creation of policy czars within the White 
House for every issue imaginable; others reflect the rise of intensely 
loyal “at-will” presidential appointees, such as the lower-level 
“personal and confidential” Schedule-C assistants created in the 
1950s through executive order,31 and the much higher-level noncareer 
members of the Senior Executive Service created under the 1978 Civil 
Service Reform Act.32 I estimate that there are about 1500 of these at-
will political appointees, all of whom discharge what the United States 
Code defines as “policy-determining” responsibilities.33 I have yet to 
find a study of how these at-will appointees behave in the absence of 
Senate-confirmed leadership, but there is ample evidence that they 
are presidential partisans, and serve only on the basis of intense 
loyalty. 
Noel Canning involves the Recess Appointments Clause, which 
has arguably generated the most innovations in today’s appointments 
process. After summarizing the facts of the case, and the past debate 
about just what constitutes a Senate recess, Krotoszynski reviews the 
decision and soon turns to the judicial response to similar interbranch 
disputes. In doing so, he tackles tough issues such as the role of the 
courts in deciding the merits of such conflicts, whether to use 
historical practice as a tiebreaker for especially tough decisions, and 
the wisdom of taking the “least unconstitutional path” in deciding 
cases such as Noel Canning. The analysis is quick and to the point, 
and exhorts us to accept the reality that not all questions will yield 
absolute results in tough cases. Instead, the courts are well advised to 
use “pragmatic formalism,” which relies on a blend of text, history, 
practice, and policy to reach decisions. Such courts would be wise to 
 
 31. See 5 C.F.R. § 212.301 (2014) (“Competitive status is acquired by completion of a 
probationary period under a career-conditional or career appointment, or under a career 
executive assignment in the former executive assignment system, following open competitive 
examination, or by statute, Executive order, or the Civil Service rules, without open competitive 
examination.”). 
 32. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 94-454, 92 Stat. 1111. For recent 
controversies and proposed repairs in the Act, see generally MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R41801, THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE: BACKGROUND AND OPTIONS 
FOR REFORM (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41801.pdf. 
 33. PAUL C. LIGHT, THICKENING GOVERNMENT: FEDERAL HIERARCHY AND THE 
DIFFUSION OF ACCOUNTABILITY 45 (1995). 
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read congressional actions broadly to explore the context in which 
seemingly simple acts such as declaring a recess occur.34 
University of California Berkeley Professor and Associate Dean 
Anne Joseph O’Connell takes readers from the recent past and into a 
possible future using the Weaver and Krotoszynski platform35 to 
analyze the actual delays in filling the “plum jobs” that open and 
close throughout an administration.36 The Plum Book, published 
every four years by alternating chambers, contains only the positions 
forwarded to the House or Senate by the agencies, however, and does 
not contain the “at-will” inferior political positions discussed above. 
Nevertheless, the Plum Book is no doubt one of the most 
frequently downloaded Government Printing Office documents in the 
months before and after an election, and is assuredly earning many 
more downloads even as this issue goes to print. More to the point of 
O’Connell’s work, this volume of data gives O’Connell an enormous 
opportunity to test her patience in monitoring every presidential 
appointment that is open for occupancy throughout an 
administration. As noted above, this process is filled with a host of 
seemingly irrelevant personal questions and financial disclosures, 
many of which show up again and again in slightly different variations 
across the long list of forms that potential nominees must complete, 
many with help from their accountants and even their high-school 
yearbooks. 
If the aim of the appointments process is to fill an administration 
with talented leaders, that goal can never be reached. Senior officers 
come and go with regularity and last two to three years on average 
before (as some would say) they “cash out” and return to the 
lobbying firms, think tanks, universities, nonprofits, and corporations 
that loaned them to the government for short engagements. Although 
cabinet secretaries almost always stay at least a term, lower-level 
offices often spin open and closed—rather like the revolving door at 
Macy’s during the annual Thanksgiving parade. 
 
 34. See generally ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014). 
 35. See generally Anne Joseph O’Connell, Shortening Agency and Judicial Vacancies 
Through Filibuster Reform? An Examination of Confirmation Rates and Delays from 1981 to 
2014, 64 DUKE L.J. 1645 (2015). 
 36. H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 112TH CONG., POLICY AND 
SUPPORTING POSITIONS app 1, at 197 (Comm. Print 2012) (summarizing positions subject to 
noncompetitive appointment in a quadrennial report commonly referred to as the “Plum 
Book”).  
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Much as they might wish to serve, the process exacts great 
patience, and not just because of the delays so carefully documented 
in O’Connell’s impressive database. Nominees must answer hundreds 
of questions along the way, not the least of which is the long White 
House questionnaire that precedes the announcement of a nominee. 
As I have argued many times over the years, a bad nominee stings the 
President to a greater degree than a great nominee brings acclaim. 
Better to withdraw before a small fact explodes than to suffer the 
slings and arrows of a national controversy. 
O’Connell’s careful analysis produces three findings that will 
help scholars analyze the ups-and-downs in filling what Benjamin 
Franklin called the “posts of honor” that should attract the nation’s 
most talented citizens to service.37 First, O’Connell shows that failure 
rates for certain positions, such as appellate courts and independent 
regulatory commissions, are much higher than for other Senate-
confirmed posts, such as department and agency chiefs.38 
Second, O’Connell finally provides precise numbers on the 
actual delays in the process. According to O’Connell’s data, the 
average number of days from nomination to confirmation from 1981 
to 2014 was about 88.5, compared with 127.2 days during the first six 
years of the Obama administration.39 She also shows that the trend 
has been rising year by year, and was not reserved just for the Obama 
administration.40 Other data suggest that the trend dates back to the 
1960s,41 but O’Connell’s work will stand as the definitive figure for 
years to come as she updates her database year after painstaking year. 
Third, O’Connell shows that delays declined with the Senate’s 
recent filibuster reform, but only for judicial nominees, not for 
executive branch officers.42 At least for now, the Senate’s “nuclear 
option” has turned out to be a firecracker at best, and one with more 
of a pop than a bang. 
 
 37. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 83 (Max Farrand ed., 
1966). 
 38. O’Connell, supra note 35, at 1661. 
 39. Id. at 1669. 
 40. Id. at 1660–61, 1669. 
 41. NAT’L ACADEMY OF PUB. ADMIN., supra note 18, at 11. Looking back to 1965, the 
time from Inauguration Day to final confirmation of each presidential advice-and-consent 
appointee accelerated from about six weeks for Lyndon Johnson (which is no doubt an outlier 
given his earlier tenure in office following John F. Kennedy’s assassination) to nine weeks for 
Richard Nixon, eleven weeks for Gerald Ford, twelve weeks for Jimmy Carter, and fourteen 
weeks for Ronald Reagan. 
 42. O’Connell, supra note 35, at 1678. 
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I would argue that O’Connell’s sobering data actually understate 
the delays. She can count only the time elapsed between the 
President’s formal nomination of a candidate and final confirmation, 
or the lack thereof. But there is an invisible process that involves 
presidential vetting in the weeks and months before a nominee is 
announced, and it is extensive.43 No one knows quite how long this 
process lasts—nor how many people are offered a post before 
someone finally accepts—but it is almost certainly a long process, and 
is no doubt intrusive. The Obama administration’s pre-nomination 
questionnaire not only asks about anything that might embarrass the 
nominee, the nominee’s family, and the President, but it also contains 
many questions linked to past appointee and even vice-presidential 
scandals, including a request for all “handles” a potential nominee 
has used to “communicate on the Internet,” and one question about 
gun ownership and usage that is almost certainly related at least in 
part to Vice President Dick Cheney’s 2006 shotgun mishap.44 
O’Connell lingers briefly on the sources of delay, but it is up to 
University of Michigan Professor Nina A. Mendelson to explore what 
she calls the “uncertain effects” of Senate delays on executive 
agencies.45 One could argue that many Senate-confirmed appointees 
eventually “go rogue” on the President, and Mendelson is absolutely 
right to argue that the lack of swift appointment undermines 
democratic accountability. Even though Mendelson acknowledges the 
bad news contained in this issue, she suggests that there might be a 
silver lining somewhere in the presidential appointments cloud.46 
Mendelson pursues the argument with some of O’Connell’s data. 
For starters, confirmation delays are not evenly spread across 
appointees.47 Department secretaries are usually confirmed within the 
first month or so of an administration, and deputy secretaries move 
 
 43. See Philip Rucker, Potential Obama Appointees Face Extensive Vetting, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 18, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/17/
AR2008111703037.html. 
 44. See, e.g., Anne E. Kornblut, Cheney Shoots Fellow Hunter in Mishap on a Texas Ranch, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/13/politics/13cheney.html 
(describing an accident in which then-Vice President Dick Cheney accidentally fired his shotgun 
at lawyer Harry Whittington during a quail-hunting trip). 
 45. See generally Nina A. Mendelson, The Uncertain Effects of Senate Confirmation Delays 
in the Agencies, 64 DUKE L.J. 1571 (2015). 
 46. Id. at 1574. 
 47. Id. 
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almost as quickly.48 As a result, the delays fall heaviest on the lower-
level appointees at the undersecretary, assistant-secretary, and 
administrator ranks, and their equivalent ranks in independent 
agencies. Most of these lower-level jobs are easily filled, moreover, 
and (I might argue) should be filled by career members of the Senior 
Executive Service. 
Mendelson also notes that the delays do not rain on all 
department and agency silos. Implementation of well-established 
programs such as Social Security and Medicare can handle most 
delays with ease—their administrative systems are generally strong, 
and careerists are well trained to operate the levers without much 
direction. Regulatory activity is much more sensitive both to delays 
and external lobbying. Decapitating a regulatory agency such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency can have enormous effects in 
delaying regulatory development.49 
The silver lining does not reside in this procedural inequality, 
however, but in the President’s role in leading the executive branch. 
Mendelson implies that Presidents may not have any less control over 
the execution of the laws simply because intermediate layers of 
appointees are missing.50 Moreover, the confirmation delays may 
actually create a de facto delayering of the federal bureaucracy’s 
bloated hierarchy. Presidents have long believed that more layers of 
leaders, and more leaders per layer, equal near-absolute bureaucratic 
control. But, as I have long argued in my work on the thickening of 
government, the reality is exactly the opposite. Additionally, 
Mendelson reminds us that the 1868 Vacancies Act, as amended in 
1988 and 1998, gives the President ample incentive to appoint career 
officers to fill vacant posts, which is almost always a good thing from 
my perspective.51 
Having more leaders increases the distance between the top and 
bottom of agencies, which increases the vulnerability to bureaucratic 
 
 48. See ANNE JOSEPH O’CONNELL, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, WAITING FOR 
LEADERSHIP: PRESIDENT OBAMA’S RECORD IN STAFFING KEY AGENCY POSITIONS AND HOW 
TO IMPROVE THE PROCESS 1 (Apr. 2010), available at https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/issues/2010/04/pdf/dww_appointments.pdf (noting that the previous five 
administrations filled their cabinets faster than President Obama by a month, but that even his 
secretaries were in place by the end of April, 2009). 
 49. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 45, at 1591 (describing apparent need for lengthy 
OIRA review of the EPA’s “waters of the United States” rule). 
 50. See, e.g., id. at 1582 (observing that appointment delays do not often leave the agency 
politically headless). 
 51. Id. at 1584–85. 
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breakdowns, such as the 2014 Department of Veterans Affairs 
waiting-list scandal. Indeed, I am convinced that the department’s 
secretary, Eric Ken Shinseki, was telling the truth when he told 
Congress that he did not know of the delays. How could he? The 
decisions were being made fifteen to twenty layers below him, with all 
of the associated opportunities for obfuscation and outright lying. 
Having explored the inventory of despair in the presidential 
appointments literature, Mendelson actually gives us a bit of hope, 
particularly those of us who worry about bureaucratic sclerosis. Her 
work should be required reading for any scholar preparing to write an 
angry criticism about the current process, not because she forgives the 
delays and harassment, but because she helps readers understand the 
little-understood impacts of a sluggish system on administrative 
design. This is not to suggest that Mendelson is an advocate of what I 
have called a “neck-less government” filled with unoccupied 
positions, but she has created enormous traction here on how 
Presidents behave. Imagine if the Obama administration had to talk 
to careerists before launching healthcare.gov. The launch might have 
turned out very differently. 
The logic of this issue concludes with a deep review of causes, 
consequences, and solutions from Columbia University Professor 
Gillian E. Metzger.52 Although the title of this foreword suggests that 
today’s complaints about delays have a “been there, done that” feel, 
she is quite right to see some kind of confluence of concern coming 
together today. And this concern just might be enough to spark 
another run at reform in the next year or so. After all, the last two 
years of a two-term presidency have long been a staging ground for 
major administrative reforms.53 Flush with confidence about the 
coming presidential election, both parties have some incentive to find 
common ground on appointments reform. 
If so, Metzger provides ample argument for action. After 
reviewing the appointments issue from a judicial and executive 
perspective, she tackles the role of partisan polarization in spurring 
innovation in governance.54 She supports this novel argument with a 
strong inventory of evidence that includes innovations such as the use 
 
 52.  See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Appointments, Innovation, and the Judicial–Political 
Divide, 64 DUKE L.J. 1607 (2015). 
 53. See, e.g., PAUL C. LIGHT, THE TIDES OF REFORM: MAKING GOVERNMENT WORK, 
1945–1995, at 90–130 (1997).  
 54. Metzger, supra note 52, at 1630–36. 
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of the reconciliation process to drive major legislation untouched 
through the minefield of potential filibusters.55 Although last year’s 
shutdown-avoiding “cromnibus” is not on her list of innovations, the 
combination of a short-term continuing resolution (cr) and a long-
term appropriations package (omnibus) was no doubt a clever respite 
from frustration. 
Metzger’s concern is that the current judicial–political divide will 
render such innovations constitutionally suspect. She does note the 
salutary effects of the divide in preventing the perversion of the 
constitutional structure for partisan advantage, but ends with a stern 
warning that the courts could intervene in ways that might amplify 
the effects of polarization.56 Innovation is not just good for economic 
growth, one might argue, but also quite helpful in generating 
agreement, if not comity. Alas, she writes that the Supreme Court’s 
recent decisions suggest an anti-innovation bent, which could 
undermine legitimate action on reforms aimed to address forms of 
polarization that may well be even worse than they look.57 
Read in order from past to present to future, these five articles 
raise important concerns, provide essential historical and textual 
context, and even create a glimmer of hope for reformers. All is not 
an accident, nor is all an unmitigated disaster. The authors also 
strongly suggest that continued innovations designed to accelerate the 
process and reinforce the take-care duty may encounter a dubious 
Supreme Court. Although the Court is no doubt performing well as a 
constitutional overseer, there has to be something more than minor 
tinkering with the current appointments process. Perhaps the Senate 
and the President will actually sit down to bargain in the old-
fashioned way, but do not be surprised if they use an extra-
constitutional conference committee to achieve agreement with a 
fiery House. One can only wonder whether the Court might opine on 
that ancient innovation if given the chance. If so, I believe the Court 




 55. Id. at 1633. 
 56. Id. at 1636–43. 
 57. Id. at 1619–20. 
